What is driving the growth of non-bank credit? The popularity and growth of non-bank or alternative lending may be
occurring for different reasons. The users of credit may be
consciously shifting away from banking channels due to the attractiveness of
alternatives such as FinTech product offerings (the diagram to the left from Kaplan & Co illustrates its growing product offering). For example, one study indicates that over 15% of digitally active
consumers have adopted FinTech product offerings such as savings and
investment, payments, borrowing and insurance services (Gulamhuseinwala, Bull
and Lewis, 2015). These authors writing
in publications for the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond posit that falling
costs of financial technology and government support have promoted competition
in financial services towards non-bank sources.
But another aspect of the growth of
non-bank credit may be a decline in the availability of traditional banking services
to consumers and businesses, including the decline in bricks and mortar branches and
forced bank lending retrenchment and de-leveraging. Effectively, credit consumers must resort to
non-bank channels for to fully and competitively meet their financial services needs. The purpose of this post is to consider
recent research into the decline of traditional banking services and understand
more what is driving this phenomenon.
Authors McCord, Prescott and Sablik (2015) find a substantial decline in
the number of commercial banks in the US since the recent financial crisis
period. They indicate a 14% decline in
the number of independent US commercial banks since 2008/9, a reduction of some
800 banks in the US. Interestingly, they
observe that the reason for this decline is in fact a collapse of new de novo
bank entries in the US. From 2002 to
2008, there were on average some 100 new banks established each year. However, their research indicates that since
the crisis period, new bank entrants have collapsed only several per year in
fact.
The reason for this collapse is not
entirely clear, but these authors believe that a combination of greater bank
regulation and growing compliance costs, weak economic conditions, perhaps a
tougher environment for capital raising and declining net interest margins may
be part of the explanation. I would offer up the challenges associated with ensuring scale for a new commercial bank charter may also be a further rationale. Large banks wield considerable market power
and can effectively buy business and drive margins lower for smaller
competitors. Further, the above noted
growing compliance costs can impact smaller firms disproportionally, compliance
systems in effect have a minimum cost regardless of bank size, thus
discouraging new banking entrants. Finally,
larger banks can be more relevant to customers and offer a broad set of
services on a cost effective basis.
This issue of bank efficiency and
profitability potentially impacting smaller banks more so than larger platforms
suggests that FinTech may offer a real alternative to consumers who would
otherwise seek out smaller new banks. It
may also suggest that community banks, even more than large banks, might
investigate partnerships with FinTech players as a survival technique and a
means to differentiate cost effective financial services.
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