Shareholder dissatisfaction with CEO compenstation disclosures

Stanford's Rock Center for Corporate Governance has just issued a report entitled "The Ideal Proxy Statement" which underscores investor unhappiness with disclosure on CEO compensation plans.

The report issued under the Stanford Closer Look Series penned by David F. Larcker and Brian Tayan dated February 17th 2015, provides compelling evidence that institutional investors are not satisfied with corporate governance practice and compensation disclosure.   Larcker and Tayan report that investors are now seeking "shorter, more concise, more candid and less legal" following recent survey data with institutional investors representing some $17 trillion in AUM.  In the survey, only 38% of the investors thought corporate disclosure standards about compensation were satisfactory.  In addition, investors often felt proxies are too legalistic and that investor PMs are only "moderately involved" in voting decision-making.  

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